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It  was a misfortune of psychology that it lacked a tradition of dealing 
with rigorous mathematical theories when psychologists were first attracted 
by information theory. Applications were made with simple-minded identifi- 
cation of psychological concepts with communication terms, without really 
paying attention to the meaning of the terms in the respective areas. Quite a 
few experiments were reported measuring human channel capacity under 
various experimental conditions without asking the basic question: Does the 
human being comply with the definition of channel in communication engi- 
neering? It  is true that, in spite of this carelessness, the bulk of experiments re~ 
ported demonstrated some systematic results as summarized by G. A. Miller 
in his concept of The Magical Number Seven. However, these experiments also 
led to various riddles and confusions as illustrated by Garner in Chapter 2 of 
this book. And this is undoubtedly the reason that many frustrated psychol- 
ogists finally gave up information theory as useless to psychology. Still, after 
the waxing and waning of information theory in psychology, an important 
recognition remained: Information processing is one of the most significant 
functions of man. The recognition must eventually revive the application of 
information theory to psychology as a sheer necessity. Probably " application" 
is not a proper word. A kind of information theory must be developed which 
is suitable to describe as complicated aa information processing mechanism as 
man. A first step toward such a theory was taken by McGill in his paper pub- 
lished in Psychometrika in 1954. What I call a misfortune of psychology is this: 
Instead of taking McGill's mathematical system (called symmetric uncerlainty 
analysis by Garner and abbreviated here as SUA) as a conceptual tool iu 
analyzing psychological problems, the tradition of psychology almost forced 
us to see it as another statistical testing technique analogous to the analysis of 
variance. As such, SUA was not so handy as the analysis of variance because 
of the lack of known distributions, and thus SUA failed to acquire popularity. 
What we needed then, and need now, is a conceptual means which logically 
bridges information theory to psychology. So the author could not do better 
in entirely leaving out of the book the significance testing aspect of SUA. 
I t  must be pointed out that SUA is not a model of human behavior. I t  is a 
system of mathematics (or, I would rather say, of logics) so that it is infallible 
as far as it goes. This aspect of SUA must be clearly remembered. Information 
theory, developed in communication engineering, is a normative theory. It  is 
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concerned primarily with the optimal information transmission system, the 
system that transmits messages as rapidly and correctly as possible under 
given constraining conditions. On the other hand, theories in psychology are 
primarily descriptive, aiming at a precise description of human behavior re- 
gardless of its degree of optimality. An application of information theory to 
psychology cannot be made by circumventing this distinction between the re- 
quired natures of theories in the two fields. One way of turning a normative 
theory into a descriptive theory is to regard the behavior of a system as op- 
timal, optimal under some unknown constraining conditions, and then to derive 
the constraining conditions from the observed, assumed optimal, behavior. 
This line of approach would prove useful if conscientiously followed. 
However, as mentioned previously, for this purpose we need a more elaborate- 
ly developed information theory than that presently available. Another line 
of application is the one that was adopted by Garner, which would be put, ac- 
cording to the revicwer's liberal interpretation, as below. 
Any observed response of a subject is not born in a vacuum. There must 
be a stimulus that causes the response. In general, however, the stimulus 
immediateIy preceding a response is not the unique determiner of the res- 
ponse. The response is made within the context of the totality of possible al- 
ternative stimuli, and furthermore it is also dependent upon the task given to 
S, where the task may be recognized as a set of rules according to which S is to 
respond to the given stimulus. Taking this for granted, it becomes a simple 
truism that the observed response can meaningfully be analyzed only if the 
real nature of the task given to S is clearly understood by E himself. In spite 
of this plain fact, we must admit that the necessity of task analysis has been 
neglected in psychology. There are quite a few published experimental reports 
in which the conclusion can be drawn almost directly from the nature of the 
task given to S. Task analysis is also very important in comparing experi- 
mental results obtained under different experimental conditions. Comparison 
and mutual checking of separate experimental results are the prerequisites to 
the accumulation of scientific knowledge, but if they are done without a 
legitimate basis, more confusion is added to what we already have in psy- 
chology in plenty. 
Now, one of the major achievements in this book is the demonstration of 
the usefulness of information theory or, more specifically, SUA as a means of 
task analysis. (" Task analysis" is the term coined by the reviewer.) A substan- 
tial part of the book, in particular Chapter 5 and later chapters, is devoted 
to the use of SUA as a task analysis I although this nature of the book is 
not made very explicit. The work is done well. In spite of the fact that the 
issues brought up are controversial, and no clear-cut solutions to the problems 
are given nor intended to be given, the power of SUA task analysis is well 
demonstrated. The author lucidly illustrates how misunderstandings of the 
real nature of experimental results are prevalent, casts doubts on traditional 
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interpretations, suggests new interpretations and new ways of investigation, 
and through all this, effectively demonstrates to the reader that SUA task 
analysis helps one to think clearly and to raise psychologically meaningful 
questions not confounded by the logical structure or the specific task given. 
Evidently, recognizing the true nature of problems is the first step toward sol- 
ving them eventually. The author's goal in writing this book was apparently to 
take this first step. The goal seems to have been achieved. 
However, it seems obvious to me that the process of achieving this goal was 
not an easy one, and the hardship is clearly reflected in the presentation of 
the book. This is a pioneering work, and like any other pioneer, Garner must 
have made his way through this "no man's land" without the aid of paved 
straight road,s, any known landmarks to keep the right direction, and so on. 
The outcome is this book; the reader might almost feel the agonies of the 
author. I often found considerable difficulty in figuring out what he was get- 
ting at, and sometimes later discovered that he was taking a long roundabout 
route. Occasionally, there are also confusions and misevaluations of his own 
findings. For these, I can hardly blame him. 
This is a pioneering work, and no pioneering work can be entirely free 
from occasional confusions and misevaluations. As a reviewer, and also as one 
who really recognizes the importance of this work, I thought that it was a part 
of my duty to straighten out some of the disputable points as much as I could, 
so that this really significant work might be appreciated by a broader audience. 
The result is this excessively long review. I hope it deserves its length. 
Before entering into a detailed review, let me begin with a brief summary 
presentation of SUA. Since SUA is the core of the book, no detailed comments 
can be made without assuming some notion of it on the part of the reader. 
Consider a multivariate contingency table. Let X,  Y,  • • • ,  Z denote the 
set of variables concerned. Each variable is assumed to take only a finite num- 
ber of discrete values. (Values may be nonnumerical.) Let x l ,  x~, • • •, x~ be 
the alternative values of X ,  and let the values of the other variables be denoted 
analogously. The entry in each cell of the multivariate table is assumed to be a 
probability, not a relative frequency. For example, the entry in the cell cor- 
responding to the values (x~, y i ,  . . .  , zk) is the probability of the joint event 
(x~, y~, • • • , zk). From the probability distribution over the whole table, one 
may obtain marginal probability distributions for various combinations of 
variables. For example, the marginal distribution for the variable X is given by 
p ( x , )  = p ( x , ,  . . .  , 
i , . . . . k  
For any subset of variables its uncertainty is defined as the entropy, or the in- 
formation measure, of the probability distribution characteristic to the subset. 
For example, U ( X Y ) ,  the uncertainty of the subset of variables X and Y, is 
glven aS 
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(1) U(X Y) = - ~ .  p(x, , y~) log p(x, , y+). 
i , i  
(The arguments X and Y generically represent any two of the random var- 
iables constituting the multivariate system. This is true for all the equalities 
introduced below.) The reason why this measure is called uncertainty is well 
known. Uncertainty is nonnegative, and it satisfies the following relation i] 
and only i] X and Y are independent. 
(2) U(X Y) = U(X) + U(Y) .  
The nominal uncertainty of a variable X, denoted Uo(X), is the maximum pos- 
sible value of U(X)  under the limitation that the number of values of X ,  n, is 
fixed. This maximum value is realized when the marginal distribution of X is 
homogeneous. Then, as is well known, Uo(X) = log n. 
Redundancy (absoluCe) of a subset of variables, for example X and Y, 
is defined as 
(3) R ( X  10 = Uo(X) + Uo(]l) -- U(X  Y).  
Redundancy (relative) is given by dividing R ( X Y )  by Uo(X) + Uo(Y). 
Redundancy is nonnegative. 
Now we will introduce a few functions which will play the central roles in 
SUA, functions which are all derived from the uncertainty function. Condi- 
tional uncertainty Ur(X)  is defined as 
(4) Ur(X) = U ( X Y ) -  U(Y) .  
Simple contingent uncertainty U(Y:X)  is defined as 
(5) U(Y:X)  = U(Y)  + U(X) - U(X Y).  
I t  is obvious that U ( Y  : X )  = U(X  : Y); i.e., simple contingent uncertainty is 
symmetric. Multiple contingent uncertainty U ( Y  : X ,  . . .  X~)  is obtained by 
replacing the single variable X in (5) by a subset of variables (X, , - . .  , X~): 
(6) U(Y:X1 . . .  XN) = U(I7) 9- U(X~ . . .  XN) -- U(YX1 . . .  X~,). 
Likewise, a function U(XI : X2 : . .  • : X~) is defined as 
(7) u ( x l  : x 2  : - - .  : x ~ )  = ~ u ( x , )  - u ( x , x 2  . . .  x N ) .  
i 
This function is called constraint by Garner, but since constraint means 
another function, too, we will call it multiplex contingent uncertainty here 
just for the convenience of reference. Multiplex contingent uncertainty is 
also symmetric. 
At this point some interpretations of SUA functions so far introduced 
would be appropriate. Conditional uncertainty is the notion called equivoca- 
tion in information theory. Ur(X) is the average residual uncertainty of X 
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when the value of Y is known. Therefore, U y ( X )  = 0 means that the value of 
X is completely specified if the value of Y is known. This relation is important 
in the task analysis to be discussed soon, where X commonly signifies the stim- 
ulus variable and Y the response variable designated as correct by the given 
task. Then Ur(X) = 0 characterizes an important class of tasks in which no 
response is correctly associated with more than one stimulus. For convenience, 
let me call such a task a normal task. 
Simple contingent uncertainty is formally equivalent to the notion known 
as the amount of transmitted information in information theory--X being in- 
put variable, Y being output variable, and U ( Y  : X )  representing the amount 
of information transmitted from input to output. Let input be the stimulus, 
output the response actually made by S to the given stimulus, and U ( Y  : X )  
the amount of information transmitted from stimulus to response. This 
measure, and others too, and therefore the whole system of SUA may then 
be used as a descriptive analytical tool when SUA is applied to a data con- 
tingency table. Chapters 2 through 4 of the book are devoted to the descrip- 
tive use of SUA for psychological problems. Although Garner's view given 
in these chapters is interesting, its importance is certainly less than that of 
the issues brought up in the later chapters, and we will not touch here upon 
the topics discussed in these early chapters. 
A fact which is of a central importance in SUA is that the "transmission" 
interpretation of U ( Y  : X )  given above is not its only interpretation. A com- 
parison of (3) and (5) will immediately reveal the resemblance between the 
forms of simple contingent uncertainty and redundancy. As a matter of fact, 
simple contingent uncertainty is redundancy if the probability distributions of 
X and Y are both homogeneous. No transmission-type interpretation is 
possible of multiplex contingent uncertainty. It  is a measure similar to redun- 
dancy, and like redundancy it represents, in a certain unambiguous way, the 
extent to which the system concerned is structured. In general, the redun- 
dancy of a system (a set of variables) is expressed as the sum of a contingent 
uncertainty and a distributional constraint defined as 
(8) DC(X1X2  . . .  XN) = ~ (Uo(Z,)  - U(X , ) ) .  
This distributional constraint component of redundancy often vanishes in 
ordinary experimental designs (when X~ represents stimulus dimensions). The 
condition for obtaining zero DC is that the marginal probability distribution 
over each stimulus dimension be homogeneous; in other words, alternative 
stimulus values must be used equally often for each stimulus dimension. For 
convenience, let us tentatively call a task homogeneous if it uses a set of 
stimuli satisfying the above condition. (This condition is made clear in Chapter 
6 but not in Chapter 5 where the author often refers to U(X~ : . . .  : X~)  
as redundancy.) 
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Our last important SUA notion to be introduced here is interaction un- 
certainty: 
(9) Y(Y: X, X2) = U(Y: X~) + U(Y: X:) + U(YX,X2), 
where U(YX~X:) is the interaction among the three variables Y, X~, and X2. 
Higher-order interaction uncertainties are defined by expanding a multiple 
contingent uncertainty like the one on the left-hand side of (9) but involving 
more than two X variables. The way of expansion is very similar to the way 
that the total sum of squares is expanded into main effects and interactions in 
the analysis of variance. The resemblance is not superficial. The total system 
of SUA is mainly concerned with the logical relationships among several func- 
tions derived from a certain function U. The equalities of SUA (at least 
those given in this book) are not at all dependent upon the definition of the 
original U function. Inequalities stating that uncertainties, conditional un- 
certainties, and contingent uncertainties are all nonnegative are all that 
depend upon the assumption that U is entropy. This independence of the 
main body of SUA from the original meaning of U is not a weakness of 
SUA bug is rather its potential power. It  is easy to show that, by changing 
the definition of U, we have the analysis of variance (as an analytical tool, 
not as a testing technique). Although underdeveloped and incomplete at 
present, SUA might possibly be developed into a branch of algebra, such 
as theory of groups, graph theory, and the like, an algebra which particularly 
fits the purposes of psychology. 
Among the notions of SUA, probably the most important are the contin- 
gent uncertainties which are used as measures of "structure" by the author. 
Consider the equality (5) (or (6) or (7)). I t  is seen from (2) that the right- 
hand side of (5) vanishes when the variables in the set considered are mutually 
independent. As the dependency, or correlation, between the variables in- 
creases, contingent uncertainty increases. It  is obvious that the author uses 
the term "structure" in the sense of probabilistic dependency. Taking this 
for granted, one thing which is not obvious is, then, why the measure is called 
contingent uncertainty. In the last chapter on page 339, in the paragraph 
which begins with the statement, "Uncertainty is prerequisite to structure," 
the author says: " . . .  to have structure is to have uncertainty. Further- 
more, to increase structure is also to increase uncertainty, and it is this aspect 
of the problem which is conceptually so important." I agree that uncertainty 
is prerequisite to structure--structure in the sense used by the author. But in 
my opinion, it is more important to recognize that structure is not uncertainty. 
More specifically, structure (as a quantity) is neither uncertainty nor cer- 
tainty, but is the amount of uncertainty reduced. The amount of structure de- 
fined as contingent uncertainty is a concept very close to the amount of in- 
formation. In fact, the amount of information is quite generally defined as 
simple contingent uncertainty, and therefore it is just one special measure of 
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the amount of structure. There is a question which often bothers the student 
of information theory: Why can information and uncertainty, two almost 
diametrically opposite concepts, be represented by the same measure? This is 
an artifact due to the simple illustrative examples used in a textbook on in- 
formation theory. In a case when there is no equivocation, the received 
message causes the complete reduction of the original uncertainty. Therefore, 
in this case, and in this case alone, the original uncertainty and the obtained 
information are equal. In general, however, uncertainty and information are 
distinctively different concepts even though they are closely related. The same 
is true for uncertainty and structure. Consider redundancy defined in (3). 
Redundancy, as well as contingent uncertainty, is a measure of structure. 
They both have a form which permits the interpretation that structure is the 
amount of uncertainty reduced. The sum of Uo's on the right-hand side of (3) 
may be looked upon as the uncertainty of a system of which only the skeletal 
structure, i.e., the number of alternative states of the system, is known. Now~ 
the second term of the expression of redundancy is the real uncertainty of the 
system. Redundancy is the difference between two uncertainties, hypothetical 
and real, thus permitting the interpretation that it is the amount of uncer- 
tainty reduced by knowing the reality. Contingent uncertainty also has a 
very similar form. The only difference is that Uo in redundancy is replaced by 
U (marginal uncertainty) in contingent uncertainty. In general, therefore, the 
amount of structure is the extent to which the real system is more restricted 
than-hypothetically assumed. If this interpretation is appropriate, then it 
also implies that the hypothetical uncertainty may be chosen fairly arbitrarily; 
that is, it may be considered, formally speaking, just as a conventional origin 
of the scale of structure. This freedom in choosing the origin gives us a real 
advantage in applying SUA to psychological problems. The reason is as 
follows: The amount of structure is the difference betwee~ hypothetical un- 
certainty and real uncertainty about the given system. In an application of 
SUA to psychological problems, the system is the task given or any subtask 
under consideration. Then by taking as the hypothetical uncertainty the S's 
prior uncertainty about the task or subtask when he is put  in the experiment, 
we may interpret the amount of structure as the maximum amount of un- 
certainty reduction the S may obtain by learning the real uncertainty in- 
volved in the task or subtask. As will be shown later, this interpretation 
helps us clear some of the ambiguities left in the book where the role of re- 
dundancy is discussed. 
Going back to the earlier point, I think that contingent "uncertainty" 
and interaction "uncertainty" are misnomers. No interpretation whatsoever 
is possible which makes their definitions compatible with the notion of un- 
certainty as such. 
In Chapter 5, the author completes his exposition of SUA. This chapter 
certainly provides the key to all the important issues discussed in this book, 
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but at the same time it is the most confusing chapter of all. One of the sources 
of confusion is that the author there definitely shifts from the descriptive use of 
SUA to its use as a tool for task analysis. I t  should be clear to the reader that 
some shift is made there. The concept of structure is introduced, and contin- 
gent uncertainties are now referred to as constraints. It  may not be so clear to 
the reader, however, that by response Garner now means the correct response 
specified by the task, not the response actually made by S. The confusion 
may further be increased by the fact that the author continues to talk about 
S's actual performance too. Most of the confusions would be removed, how- 
ever, by understanding the author's intention this way: Task analysis is 
important just because the nature of the task, or the structure of the task, 
is the principal determiner of the S's performance under the task. Taking 
an extreme case, the nature of the task is the only determiner of S's per- 
formaace when the task is so easy as to allow S a perfect performance. In 
general, it is true that S's performance can hardly be evaluated properly 
unless the structure of the task is clearly understood. 
The basic equality used by the author for task analysis is 
(10) U ( Y :  X1 : X~ : . . .  : X~)  = U ( Y :  X1X~ . . .  XN) 
+ U(X1 :X~ : - . -  :X~).  
This equality can be derived directly from (6) and (7). Now suppose that 
Y represents the correct response variable used in a given task and' X1 , 
X2, • • • , X~ the stimulus dimensions used. Then the first term in the right- 
hand side of (I0) (multiple contingent uncertainty) represents the structure 
holding between the correct response variable and the stimulus variable. 
Under this interpretation of variables, this multiple contingent uncertainty 
is called external constraint, and it may be interpreted as the amount of 
information transmitted by an ideal subject who executes the task perfectly. 
This measure would then serve as a reference value to describe the actual 
S's performance, and it gives the upper limit of possible transmission if the 
task is normal, i.e., if 
(11) Ur(X~X2 "." XN) = O. 
Most of the tasks dealt with in this book are normal. The second term in the 
right-hand side of (10), the multiplex contingent uncertainty now being 
called internal constraint, certainly represents the structure within the dimen- 
sions of stimuli used in the task. The left-hand side of the equality, which is 
also a multiplex contingent uncertainty, is now called total constraint. With 
this new terminology the equality (10) is now verbally stated as follows: The 
total constraint is the ~um of the internal constraint and the external constraint. 
I t  is important to remember equality (I0) and its verbal statement in 
order to understand correctly the task analysis done by the author. One thing, 
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however, bothers me. In Chapter 5, the author keeps emphasizing the im- 
portance of the above statement--to quote one example (page 174) " . . .  if 
total constraint is held constant, then internal and external constraint are 
interchangeable, such that one increases by exactly the same amount as the 
other decreases. This fact prevents independent manipulation of internal and 
external constraint." This statement is right, but  it is trivial. If one increases 
a part of a whole while keeping the total constant, the rest must decrease 
exactly by the same amount. Since (10) is an equality, not an equation, 
nothing more than this trivial truth can be drawn from it. There are occasions, 
however, when a logically trivial statement acquires some real, normative 
implications--that is, when the definitions from which the statement is de- 
rived are forgotten. Consider, for example, a homogeneous task. With a homo- 
geneous task, stimulus redundancy is identical to internal constraint. Now, 
redundancy is a familiar concept. However, many people would have forgotten 
its exact definition. By substituting "redundancy" in place of internal con- 
straint in the author's statement cited above, the statement comes to serve as a 
warning: I] total constraint is held constan$, external constraint decreases by 
exactly the same amount as redundancy increases. This rephrased statement 
really has an interesting implication as will be seen soon. 
In applying (10) to psychological tasks, the author confines himself 
within the class of normal tasks characterized by (11). (Actually, the author 
uses a more restricted class of tasks characterized by U r ( X ,  . . .  XN)  = 
Ur,...x~ (Y) -- 0. That is, he talks about tasks such that one-to-one corre- 
spondence holds between stimuli and associated correct responses. However, 
(11) is all that is needed for the author's arguments in Chapter 5.) Now, 
by applying (11) to (10) we have 
(12) ~ u ( x , )  = u ( x , x ~  . . .  x~)  + u ( x ,  : x 2  : . . .  : x~ ) ,  
i 
since U ( Y )  = U ( Y X 1 X 2  . . .  X ~ )  if (11) holds. The reader will recognize that 
(12) is identical to (7), the equality by which multiplex contingent uncer- 
tainty is defined. However, (12) has something more than what is involved in 
(7); the three terms in (12) now have specific meanings--total constraint, ex- 
ternal constraint, and internal constraint from left to right, respectively. I t  
must be correctly understood that such meanings can be given to the three 
terms of (12) lust by virtue of the assumption (11). 
This point seems to need a further emphasis. As has been mentioned re- 
peatedly, SUA is not a theory nor a model, but it is a system of logics. Inas- 
much as it is a logical system, it helps us think clearly and carry out logical 
deductions correctly. One should not expect that anything very novel would 
turn up from the main body of SUA itself. But if any material assumption, 
like the equation (11), is added to the system of SUA, various implications of 
this particular assumption will be effectively uncovered by the power of the 
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prefabricated logical system of SUA. Whenever this happens in an application 
of SUA, it is very important to keep in mind that all the novel aspects of the 
deductions made come from the assumption itself and not from SUA. I 
point this out here because, although Garner occasionally reminds us of the 
existence of the assumption (11), a casual reader would very likely overlook 
the important role played by the assumption. For example, there is the state- 
ment on page 152 in Chapter 5: "Redundancy has no effect on total con- 
straint as long as each variable retains its maximum uncertainty." Here, 
"redundancy" means internal constraint. Maximum or not, as long as (mar- 
ginal) uncertainties of the variables are held constant, the left-hand side of 
(12) remains constant. Since this term is total constraint under (11), any in- 
troduction of redundancy which keeps the sum of marginal uncertainties in- 
tact does not affect total constraint. I t  is clear that the above statement does 
not stand alone but calls for (11) or a similar assumption for its justification. 
Now we will see how (12) is used for the analysis of normal tasks, and 
what the task analysis is really like. The external constraint, U(X1X~ . . .  XN), 
which is often called stimulus variability by Garner, represents the maximum 
possible transmission from stimulus to response, or it may be viewed as the 
actual transmission to be made by an errorless ideal subject. So where "trans-  
mission" is legitimately regarded as a major dependent variable, as in dis- 
crimination experiments, the value of stimulus variability may play a central 
role. Consider, for example, two normal discrimination tasks, one with high 
stimulus variability and the other with low stimulus variability. If a high real 
transmission is obtained with the former task and a low one with the latter, 
this result might just be reflecting the difference in the maximum possible 
transmission in the two tasks and thus mean nothing empirically valuable. 
One should not be disappointed by this sort of weak conclusion drawn 
from task analysis. One great merit of having SUA task analysis is that 
it allows one to build an empirical theory or a model upon the logical basis 
of SUA--for example, a model that will predict actual transmission on 
the basis of the maximal transmission. Many information theoretical con- 
cepts, like channel capacity, noise, coding, etc., will be useful in constructing 
such a model. (One such has been published recently by Garner and Lee in 
Perceptual and Motor Skills, 1962, 15, 367-388.) In this book, however, the 
author does not make dear his view on the relationship between ideal per- 
formanee and actual performance. This is not very surprising since he does 
not even make explicit that in a considerable part of the book he is working on 
the ideal subject's ideal performance, and not on the S's actual performance. 
Our next probIem is the question about the effect of internal constraint 
upon discrimination transmission. For the sake of simplicity, we will assume 
that the given discrimination task is not only normal but also homogeneous, 
i. e., U(X)  = Uo(X) for every stimulus dimension. Then internal constraint is 
identical to redundancy. The answer to the above question, however, depends 
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upon how we interpret this question. In (12), there are three terms, and two 
of them can be fixed independently. If we choose stimulus variability and 
redundancy as independent variables, obviously redundancy has no effect 
upon ideal transmission, since ideal transmission is simply identical to stim- 
ulus variability. But if we choose stimulus variability as the dependent 
variable in constructing a discrimination task, then (i) ideal transmission 
increases with total marginal uncertainty for a fixed redundancy, (ii) ideal 
transmission decreases with redundancy for fixed marginal uncertainties. 
(These correspond to the two conclusions given in the book on p.165.) One 
may notice that the second statement above is a version of the previously 
given warning, which will now be rephrased: As long as total constraint is 
held constant, the effect of redundancy upon ideal transmission is detrimental. 
(This is also true for tasks which are not normal.) In this form, the state- 
ment is certainly nontrivial, since it appears to contradict our common 
belief that redundancy should help discrimination. The truth is simple, 
however. Redundancy helps discrimination only under certain circum- 
stances. But in order to introduce redundancy in a way that will help dis- 
crimination, one cannot, in general, keep total constraint constant. For 
the purpose of illustration, consider a discrimination task in which a ran- 
dom noise is present. Suppose that the stimulus is unidimensional and takes 
two values with equal frequency. The ideal transmission per trial is one bit if 
noiseless. Assuming that even the ideal subject suffers from noise, the presence 
of noise decreases the ideal transmission. This deleterious effect of noise can 
be substantially overcome, however, if the task is modified by making the 
stimulus multidimensional but keeping the stimulus values on different 
dimensions completely correlated. This modification does not change the 
ideal transmission in the noiseless case. However, it would increase the prob- 
ability that the one-bit discrimination task is correctly executed, if noise 
operatcs independently upon different dimensions. This is a well-known 
effect; it is just one example of the use of redundancy to combat noise. But, 
obviously, total constraint, or the sum of marginal uncertainties, must in- 
crease to use redundancy this way. (In the Garner-Lee paper cited above, a 
more elaborate discussion is given on this point.) 
So far, we have discussed the primarily detrimental effect of redundancy 
upon discrimination performance. Garner points out in the same context that 
the form of redundancy as well as its amount is important when we deal with 
the effect of redundancy. Because of the significance of this issue I would 
like to go a little farther in its formalization than he does. With an appropriate 
modification of (9), we can expand total internal constraint into a series of 
partial internal constraints (simple contingencies and interactions): 
(13) U ( X 1  : X ~  : . . .  : X~¢) 
= ~ v ( x ,  :x;) + ~2 u ( x , x , x ~ )  + . . .  + u ( x ,  x2 . . .  x , , ) .  
i < /  i < i < k  
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For the sake of simplicity, let us assume that the task is homogeneous. 
Then the left-hand side of (13) is total redundancy within the stimulus system. 
The right-hand side of (13) then specifies how the total redundancy is allocated 
into partial redundancies. How the total amount of redundancy is allocated 
over component partial redundancies then defines the "form" of redundancy 
of the system. 
The example brought up by the author to demonstrate the importance of 
the form of redundancy is as follows: Consider a discrimination task (normal 
and homogeneous) in which the ideal subject cannot attend to all of the 
dimensions of the displayed stimulus because of noise. Assume, for example, 
that  he can attend to only two out of the total N dimensions and that  the 
selection of the two is made at random from trial to trial. Then the average 
amount of transmission made by the ideal subject per trial, Av U(Y  : X,X~), 
is given by 
Av U(Y: X,X~) = Ic ~ U(Y: X,X~), 
where k = 1/(N).  Since the task is normal, 
u(Y: x , x , )  = v ( x , x i )  = v ( x , )  + u (x : , )  - v ( x ,  :x,), 
and therefore 
(14) Av U(Y: X ,X , )  = (N - 1)k ~ U(X,) - k ~_, U(X, : X,) .  
i i < i  
I t  is obvious from (14) that the effect of introducing redundancy (correspond- 
ing to the second term on the right) holding total constraint (corresponding to 
the first term) constant is detrimental to transmission. However, it is also 
obvious from (14) that no partial redundancies other than simple contingen- 
cies have any effect at all upon transmission when S attends to only two of the 
total stimulus dimensions. In other words, there is even the possibility that 
the ideal transmission is increased by introducing redundancy holding total 
constraint constant if the increase in redundancy means an increase in inter- 
actions which more than makes up for a decrease in simple contingencies. 
This is possible only if it is known that the number of dimensions to which 
the ideal subject can attend is always two. The crucial point here, however, is 
not that increased redundancy may still help discrimination, but that redun- 
dancy can be used effectively only if the structure of noise is known. Of course, 
the effective use of redundancy necessitates some kind of matching between 
the structure of redundancy and the structure of noise. 
Besides discrimination tasks, paired-associate tasks and free-recall tasks 
are touched upon in Chapter 5. I t  is true, as the author argues, that there is 
not much formal difference in SUA forms between discrimination and paired- 
associate tasks. But they are certainly different in their psychological impli- 
cations. Accordingly, an SUA treatment different from that used in the 
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analysis of discrimination tasks (in which the primary problem is noise) is 
called for to deal with paired-associate tasks (where the primary concern is 
how S learns the given external constraint). Since the author does not go 
very far in this problem, I will also refrain from going into any serious dis- 
eussion on this topic except to make one suggestion. With a discrimination 
task, S normally knows the external structure, but  he cannot produce that 
much transmission because of the presence of noise. (The term "noise" is used 
here in a very loose way.) On the other hand, with a paired-associate task, S 
cannot produce transmission identical to the amount of external constraint 
simply because he does not know the form of external constraint. So the 
primary concern in the paired-associate task is how S learns external structure, 
and, in this vein, I would like to have the reader recall one of my earlier 
comments: Simple contingency (external constraint) is a measure of structure 
which has a form of hypothetical uncertainty minus the exact uncertainty of 
the system. So if one takes S's real uncertainty at each moment as the hypo- 
thetical uncertainty, he will obtain a convenient measure of how much of the 
structure is left for S to learn. In doing this, however, one must expand the 
present system of SUA, and I here will be satisfied by pointing out that SUA 
has a potentiality of handling learning-type psychological problems. 
The author gives the free-recall task a position in contrast to the other 
two kinds of tasks so far discussed. There are two assertions explicitly made: 
(i) In free-recall, what S is to learn is internal constraint; (ii) The effect of 
redundancy upon free-reeaU performance is detrimental. I have objections to 
both of these statements. First, there is a logical difficulty in defining the 
internal constraint of a free-recaU task in which S is to learn a unique list m 
where formally no probabilities are involved. This is a difficulty which, in 
spirit, is very close to the difficulty in defining the redundancy of a unique 
visual pattern pointed out by the author in Chapter 6. My objection to the 
second statement comes from the nonlinearity of the relation between the 
task-difficulty of a free-recall problem and the redundancy (as the author 
defines it) within the list. The nonlinearity is demonstrated easily. To take an 
obvious example, there is substantially no task-difficulty in free-recall if the 
list is 100 per cent redundant, meaning that there is a single word in the list. 
On the other hand, as Garner points out, there is little task-difficulty in 
learning a list of no redundancy, since S can generate the whole list by com- 
bining every component with every other--if S knows the components. 
One may wonder why Garner's second statement given above means to 
put  the free-recall task in a position in contrast to the discrimination task. 
As a matter of fact, this comes from the same source which brought most of 
the confusions in Chapter 5. I t  seems to me that when he wrote Chapter 5 the 
author was under a strong conviction that redundancy must aid discrimina- 
tion. This conviction is right; redundancy aids discrimination if it is so used. 
Garner, however, took an unfortunate strategy in proving it; he attempted the 
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proof under the assumption of constant total constraint, where, as we have 
already seen, the effect of increased redundancy is primarily detrimental. 
Even though he arrived at this conclusion, it seems to me that it was with 
mixed feelings and he occasionally makes a statement in favor of his original 
conviction. At any rate, my greatest regret concerning Chapter 5 is that the 
author did not rearrange it. In Chapter 6 where he no longer sticks to the 
unreasonable assumption of constant total constraint, most of the confusions 
in Chapter 5 are substantially straightened out! 
In the latter half of the book, beginning with Chapter 6, various prob- 
lems in experimental psychology are analyzed and discussed in terms of the 
concepts and the system of SUA developed in the first half of the book. Al- 
though many interesting developments are made and valuable suggestions 
are given there, I shall not go very far into reviewing all the subjects discussed. 
This does not mean, however, that these chapters are relatively less important 
than Chapter 5. On the contrary, most substantial contributions of this book 
to contemporary psychology are found in these later chapters. But I can 
easily justify spending most of the space of this book review in discussing 
Chapter 5. First, Chapter 5 is the hardest part of the book to understand, and 
the later chapters are relatively easy to read once the reader survives it. 
Furthermore, as I see it, the greatest merit of this book lies not in the actual 
accomplishments presented, but  rather in the future potentiality of the method 
demonstrated in it. So the reader should not be misled to the impression that 
the following brief comments exhaust the interesting topics discussed. What 
I shall cover will be about one-hundredth of the important topics touched 
upon by the author--which are so diverse, so inspiring and so disputable that 
the reader might possibly be motivated to write another book if he is really 
involved in the author's arguments. 
In Chapter 6, the author discusses the problem of pattern perception, the 
problem which usually shapes itself in the discrimination task with a multi- 
dimensional stimulus structure. This is also the area in which most of the 
experimental studies on the effect of redundancy have been made. As the 
author points out, the experimental results so far obtained do not lend them- 
selves to an easy, straightforward interpretation about the effect of redun- 
dancy. I t  is demonstrated, however, that many ambiguities and contra- 
dictions existing in the literature can be straightened out by the application 
of SUA task analysis, even though many problems are yet  left open. 
The experiments reported in this area are usually of the following design: 
Two pattern discrimination tasks are compared, one with high redundancy 
within the given set of patterns, and the other with little or no redundancy. 
In both tasks, the sizes of the sets of patterns are equal, and the tasks are 
normal. This then means that the stimulus variability, or ideal transmission 
U ( Y  : X1 . . .  XN),  is the same for both tasks. In this type of experimental de- 
sign, what is held constant is external constraint, not total constraint, and 
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accordingly the "redundant" task should have more total constraint than the 
"nonredundant" task. Now, what effect' would this increased total constraint 
have upon actual transmission (not on ideal transmission, since ideal trans- 
mission is the same for both tasks)? I t  is in general hard to find any definite 
psychological meaning for total constraint, but if tasks are normal, as they are 
in this case, total constraint is just the sum of marginal uncertainties. And the 
sum of marginal uncertainties, as I have repeatedly suggested, somehow corre- 
sponds to S's initial uncertainty about the given set of stimuli. Taking this 
interpretation for granted, we may say that there is more to learn in the struc- 
ture of the "redundant" task than in that of the "nonredundant" task and 
therefore it is expected that the S's performance will be poorer with the 
redundant task, at least at the beginning. On the other hand, if there is any 
noise--a factor that may hinder S from attending to the whole stimulus--S 
would be more protected from making an error with the "redundant" task, if 
he has already learned the redundancy. In general, the greater the redundancy 
the more there is to learn, since S's original uncertainty should be greater with 
greater redundancy. But once he has learned the structure of redundancy com- 
pletely, then greater redundancy means greater protection. This one thing is 
already enough to complicate the issue of the effect of redundancy. I t  is, how- 
ever, further complicated by the fact that partial redundancies have differen- 
tial effects upon discrimination performance when noise is present--and noise 
is always present if a discrimination experiment is to make any sense at all. 
For example, as may be seen in (14), interaction-type partial redundancies 
can have no effect upon discrimination if the noise prohibits S from attending 
to more than two stimulus dimensions. From this, one may derive a conclu- 
sion: If redundancy is to be introduced to combat noise, an effective form of 
redundancy is to have large simple contingencies, although the most effective 
form cannot be determined unless the structure of noise is given. This conclu- 
sion may seem at variance with Garner's statement that large simple contin- 
gencies are bad for discrimination. This statement is also true, but it is 
true only if the compared tasks share the same total constraint. 
Now the question is: What if the two tasks share both total constraint 
and external constraint? The only possible answer is that it all depends on the 
nature of noise. By now it should be apparent that the effect of redundancy 
upon discrimination is a considerably complicated issue, and it is not at  all 
surprising that no straightfoward effect of redundancy has been reported in 
the literature. The demonstration of the logically complicated structure of 
pattern discrimination is a good example of the power of SUA, but SUA can 
certainly do more once the specific structure of the task is given and the 
nature of the noise operating is specified--for which a special analysis of the 
types of errors S makes must be made. Then SUA can tell fairly precisely 
what type of performance one can expect as a result. 
Under certain circumstances, the above considerations are still insuffi- 
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cient. Very often the investigators of pattern perception talk about the 
redundancy of a unique pattern. Gkrner points out that redundancy of a 
unique pattern can be defined only with a certain assumption about S's 
subjective population of which the particular unique pattern is regarded as a 
sample. This is the problem concerning S's original uncertainty I have been 
talking about, and generally speaking this issue of S's original uncertainty 
is relevant not only to the case of the unique pattern but also to any given 
set of patterns. The author gives an interesting example, although in a different 
context: Consider a 3 X 3 matrix pattern in which each cell can be either 
black or white. Suppose that only those matrices with only two cells black are 
selected as the set of stimuli to be discriminated. This means that  only 36 
matrices are used out of 2 ~ possible matrices, so that the selected set of stimuli 
is quite redundant. This value of redundancy is given, of course, under the 
presumption that the color of each cell is taken as a variable, or dimension, of 
the given stimulus. But what if S knows that there are always only two black 
cells and takes the positions of these two black cells as the relevant variables 
to describe the system? The answer is clear: There is no redundancy in the 
given set of stimuli. I t  would very probably be true that S's original uncer- 
tainty about the given stimulus is about 9 bits unless E explicitly tells S that 
there are only two black cells all the time. But in this particular case, even 
if not told, S would quickly learn the constraint--the nature of redundancy-- 
and then would switch from his original 9-variable conception of the system 
to the new 2-variable conception of the system. This is a process of recoding. 
I am not contending that the "learning of redundancy" always means a 
recoding process, but  I think it is true that very often learning of redundancy 
occurs by means of recoding. The most important fact of all is that one can- 
not talk about redundancy unless one specifies the variable-system used by S, 
and that the crucial psychological problems involved here are what variable- 
systems are natural to S and how S modifies them through experience. 
In Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 the redundancy of language and how the 
redundancy is utilized in human verbal behavior are discussed. Many aspects 
of this issue are discussed, but the principal one is the analysis of the form of 
language redundancy in SUA terms and the relevance of the form to the use of 
language redundancy. These chapters are rich in ingenious suggestions which 
will certainly arouse interest and controversy among psychologists in this 
field. I will not, however, go into any detail for these chapters. 
In Chapter 8 perceptual-motor tasks are discussed. The author's major 
arguments are upon the advantage of response lag. The necessary materials 
for the argument are mostly provided by the considerations made in the pre- 
ceding two chapters on language, where the advantage of bilateral pre- 
diction over unilateral prediction in dealing with a time series is discussed. 
Theoretically, the longer the response lag the more the amount of information 
available for the prediction. But in perceptual-motor tasks the utility of 
BOOK REWEWS 309 
quick response is usually involved. Besides that, there is a problem of finite 
memory span, which is certainly one of the major sources of noise in human 
performance. There should be an optimal response lag in each perceptual- 
motor task, but the optimality depends upon many factors. The author also 
argues t h a t  the optimal amount of (relative) redundancy in the stimulus 
series is about 50 per cent. This would, by and large, be true, although the 
argument would have been made more persuasive if the author added to it 
some considerations on how the optimal lag is related not only to the amount 
but also ~to the form of redundancy of the given time series. 
In Chapter 10 the concept-formation task is discussed. I t  is obvious that 
concept tasks are in many ways similar to paired-associate tasks. But there is 
one essential difference between these two: Paired-associate tasks are generally 
normal, but concept tasks cannot be normal by definition. The "concept" in 
concept-formation experiments is the common label attached by the task 
to more than one stimulus, but not all stimuli, in the stimulus set. Further- 
more, it is customary in concept tasks for the stimulus dimensions to be well 
defined and to involve irrelevant dimensions, the values of which have nothing 
to do with the concepts, or correct responses. Strictly speaking, virtually any 
experiment whatsoever involves one or another irrelevant stimulus dimension, 
like accidental sounds in the experimental room, etc. Such an unintentional 
stimulus is so obviously irrelevant that S is always ready to disregard it. 
In concept learning, however, irrelevant dimensions are intentionally added 
to serve as a"conceptual noise"so to speak. Therefore, the learning of external 
structure in u concept task necessarily involves learning to disregard irrelevant 
dimensions. 
In Chapter 10, as in the other chapters, the author's major concern is to 
investigate the possible effects of redundancy upon performance. On the 
basis of a few relevant experiments he makes some very interesting sugges- 
tions. First, the search for structure is inherent in behavior. To this point, 
few psychologists would object, except some die-hard S-Rians. Secondly, 
structures in the form of simple contingencies or lower-order interactions are 
easier to notice and learn than higher-order interactions. This also sounds 
reasonable. From these plausible assumptions, the author makes predictions: 
If redundancy exists within relevant dimensions and not in irrelevant dimen- 
sions, this structure within relevant dimensions will help S's quick disregard 
of irrelevant dimensions. If the reverse is true, S's attention will tend to be 
attracted to irrelevant dimensions, and the process of concept formation 
will be slowed down. Such effects of redundancy will be more pronounced if 
the redundancy is more heavily loaded on simple contingencies. Although 
experiments more elaborately designed than those presently available are 
needed to give full credit to this hypothesis, the hypothesis itself is already 
giving a good credit to the author's original claim that SUA helps to raise 
psychologically meaningful questions. 
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There is one minor logical error in this chapter. On page 322 is a state- 
ment "[Holding external constraint constant] . . .  the stimulus equivocation 
(Ur(X)) is decreased by exactly the same amount that the internal con- 
straint is increased." This statement is right, but the proof given for this 
statement on the next page is meaningless. The correct proof is as follows: 
Internal Constraint = U(X~ : - . .  :X~) = ~ U(X~) - U(X~ . . .  X~) ,  
i 
External Constraint = U ( Y :  X~ . . .  XN) = U ( Y )  + U(X ,  . . .  XN) 
- U ( Y X ,  . . .  X~) 
= v ( x ,  . . .  x , , )  - v y ( x l  . . .  x ~ ) .  
Assuming that  ~ U ( X , )  is held constant, stimulus variability 
U(X1 " "  XN) is decreased by exactly the same amount that internal con- 
straint is increased. But, since external constraint is held constant, stimulus 
equivocation Ur(X1 "'" X~)  is decreased by exactly the same amount that  
stimulus variability is decreased. QED. 
In the last chapter, the author recapitulates the major assertions he made. 
I should like to make a last comment here also, which is in agreement with 
one of the author's last suggestions. I think that, even though task analysis 
alone will do a good job in clarifying the nature of psychological problems, 
still better understanding will be attained by applying SUA, or its more 
developed version, to the structure of the person given the task and to the 
structure of the interaction between the person and the task. I have repeatedly 
pointed out the importance of explicitly specifying the structure of noise, and 
the structure of noise would generally be a part of either the structure of the 
person or the structure of person-task interaction, or both. Still greater use 
of SUA will be achieved by modifying it so as to be applicable to noninfor- 
mation measures, a possibility mentioned earlier, since the concept of infor- 
mation is, though important, not sufficient to yield a complete theory of 
behavior. 
Hokkaido University, Japan  MaSANAO TODA 
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ELIZABETH DUFFY. Activation and Behavior. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962. Pp. 
384 -t- xvii. 
Since the early 1930's Elizabeth Duffy has been a leading proponent of the view that  
the level of "arousal" or "activation" plays an important role in explaining behavior. 
Too often her theoretical and experimental contributions in this field have been ignored, 
and if nothing else, this book should provide the recognition due her. The most important 
contribution of the book lies in the organization of over 800 references in the area of 
activation so that  they will be more readily usable. The work of compilation and organiza- 
tion is a valuable contribution and should not be minimized. I t  could only have been done 
by a person with Prof. Duffy's scholarship and experience. 
The central issue of the book, and an important issue for all interested in behavior, 
is "how much does a concept of global activation help in understanding behavior?" Duffy 
believes that  i t  is necessary for understanding behavior, and this view is shared by a good 
many psychologists. Nonetheless, there is empirical room for those who might doubt the 
importance of "general activation" in psychological theory, since there is little direct 
objective support for the concept. Whether or not terms used to represent general arousal 
will be part of the armamentarium of future behavioral scientists undoubtedly depends upon 
the existence of reliable and valid measurements of the activation of an individual. Without 
satisfactory measurements the concept of arousal is doomed to oblivion. The many, many 
attempts at measurement of a person's degree of activation can be inferred from the 
extensive bibliography. For Duffy, activation is defined as "the extent of release of potential 
energy, stored in the tissues of the organism, as this is shown in activity or response." 
But she argues that  activation is not the same as the amount of observable activity although 
there must be some relation between the two. A person may be inhibiting overt responses 
and yet  releasing a considerable amount of energy. A cat waiting by a mouse hole would 
typify this circumstance. Because overt behavioral activity is not accepted as a measure 
of activation, it must be inferred from other criteria such as measures of peripheral and 
internal reactions. 
For the most part psychologists have used physiological measures as indices of 
arousal or activation. The galvanic skin response (GSR), the electroencephalogram (EEG),  
and the electrical activity in muscles have been very popular measures. However, others 
have been used: heart rate, blood pressure, respiration, and oxygen consumption. Each 
presumably reflects something about the arousal status of the individual. However, the 
general lack of correlation found between indicators of global activation presents a con- 
ceptual problem. Typically, the correlations between physiological variables, each of 
which is purported to be an index of activation, are low and often not significant. Further-  
more, test-retest correlations are not  sizable enough to be encouraging nor is there much 
consistency in the responses of individuals exposed to similar situations. Given these 
kinds of results, advocates of activation theories must strive to find rationales to justify 
the use of a general activation concept. 
Duffy suggests that  activation might be likened to the economic strength of a com- 
munity. Any one index of the economy might be only remotely related to any other, 
yet  in its own way each would reflect the business and industrial growth of the area. Duffy 
points out that  the analogy cannot be pushed too far. However, even in the example one 
might question the value of a description of the "economic condition" of a community 
when the indices were found to be practically unrelated. Wouldn't  this indicate a rather 
specialized type of economic development which should be further investigated? 
I t  may be that  the pooling of many measures of activation, as suggested by Duffy, 
will provide the best index, but  the reader will be disappointed to find that  no indication 
is given as to how to combine the several measures. Maybe one pooled measurement is 
better than the individual measures taken separately. In fact, i t  might be possible to find 
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beta weights in regression equations using the scores of many variables which will allow 
the equation to predict the results expected on the basis of activation theory. Perhaps 
someone will t ry  it, but  it has not been done. The odds are rather long against finding 
beta weights which would be effective across many situations and populations. 
Theory has far outdistanced fact in work with arousal. Today, concepts like arousal 
have achieved great popularity. The enormous attention given to generalized phySiological 
effects of stimulation of the brain stem reticular formation has been a godsend to activation 
theorists. However, i t  should be noted that  the generalized effects attributed to brain 
stem mechanisms are becoming fewer with increased numbers of experimental studies 
analyzing the brain stem functions. 
The book itself is well organized and should provide a boon to the specialist who 
deals with one or another area of arousal. Yet, the careful organization results in a certain 
dullness in the text  because the same studies are discussed in one chapter and then in 
another . . .  and then in another. In  total perspective, however, there is no doubt that  
Duffy has provided a true compendium of research on activation which will be of great 
value to the profession. 
The University of 3~richigan ROBEI~T L. ISA/tCSON 
QUINN MCNEMAR. Psychological Statistics. (3rd ed.) New York: John Wiley and Sons, 
Inc., 1962. Pp. viii -t- 451. $7.75 
The third edition of this classic in applied statistical methods remains one of the 
best books of its kind in the field. A major change from the second edition is the adoption 
of upper ease S, rather than ~, to designate the "ordinary" standard deviation, i.e., the 
square root of the arithmetic mean of squared sample deviations. Additions include a 
chapter on trend analysis; a discussion of empirical work on the effects of assumption 
violations on the t and F tests; a proof that  s * is an unbiased estimator of ~'; an algebraic 
determination of the expected values of variance estimates in one-way analysis of variance; 
and some additional nonparametric techniques. 
While the use of S rather than a may be helpful in a discussion of descriptive methods, 
it would have been better to discard it  at  the end of chapter 3 and avoid the confusion 
which it  causes in chapters on inference. There are sounder reasons for using an unbiased 
estimate than the fact that  N < 30, and one has the feeling that  the author himself wishes 
tha t  he had abandoned S long before Chapter 14 (Inferences About Variabilities). The 
N < 30 situation seems also to call forth the use of Student 's distributiou to replace the 
normal as an appropriate model for testing the difference between two means (Chapter 7). 
While i t  is explained later in the discussion that  i t  is the use of s in place of a that  makes t 
the appropriate test statistic, the introductory statements, as well as the chapter  title 
(Small Sample or t Technique), have already made their impression. 
This book remains a mathematically sound, reasonably comprehensive how-to-do-it 
volume and will continue to be of value as a reference for applied work in the  field. I t  no 
longer seems appropriate, however, as a basic teaching text for use by psychologists. 
There are signs that  students in the social sciences now are not  so fearful of mathematics 
as those of ten years ago. They should be provided with a proper basis in probability 
theory and a sounder theoretical foundation in statistics. Given such a background, students 
should be able to carry out their analyses successfully even when no published "recipe" 
fits their problem. Perhaps the long-term result would be an improvement in the quality 
of research in the behavioral sciences. 
Teachers College, Columbia University RICHARD H. Ll[NDEMAN 
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K. J. ARaow, SAMUEL KAR~aN, AND PATraCK SUPPES. Mathematical Methods in the Social 
Sciences, I959. Stanford, California: Stanford Univ. Press, 1960. Pp. 365 + vii. $8.50 
Mathematical psychology being what it is these days, only a naive or inebriated 
reviewer would attempt to pass judgment on every article in a book reflecting much of the 
current work in the field. Those still attempting "critical experiments" to test, say "sto- 
chastic learning theory"--and one continues to hear of such experiments--need to be put 
face to face with the ordeal of reading in detail each of the chapters in this book. The 
illusion of a single monolithic theory capable of being rejected (or accepted!) would quickly 
dissolve. I can only try to subtly by-pass my specific assignment by confining my remarks 
to general statements on the trends, healthy or otherwise, suggested by these papers. 
The twenty-three papers in this volume were presented at a symposium on mathe- 
matical methods in the social sciences in the summer of 1959. Nine of the papers have 
been grouped together under the heading Economics, four under Management Science, 
and the remaining ten under Psychology. The ten psychological papers, with which this 
review is solely concerned, include five papers on learning by Atkinson, Burke, Bush, 
Estes, and Suppes; four papers on measurement (or, to use a more contemporary term, 
choice) by T. W. Anderson, Marschak, Luce, and H. Solomon; and a paper by Galanter 
and Miller which attempts to show the close relationship between reflex theory and current 
stochastic theories in learning, psyehophysics, and communication. 
The degree to which mathematical theorists extend or generalize previous work 
is a good indication of the health of the field. I t  is both aesthetically and pragmatically 
unappealing to contemplate a continual increase in the current pool of unconnected, 
fragmented models. Such increases are not mitigated by the fact that each new model 
undoubtedly contains an element of truth for some highly artificial situation. One notes 
then with some pleasure Anderson's conceptualization of Guttman's recent multivariate 
work in terms of familiar stochastic processes, Atkinson's simultaneous treatment of 
both the component and pattern models of discrimination, Burke's extension of the linear 
operator learning model to two person interactions, Bush's elaboration of Luce's beta 
(learning) model, Estes' extension of Bower's random walk theory of choice, Luce's 
extension of his choice theory to response latencies, and Suppes' extension of the finite, 
discrete stimulus sampling learning theories to a response continuum. 
In  one sense, Marschak's analysis of binary choices (pair comparisons) is also a 
generalization of previous theories, in this case psychological scaling theories. Marschak's 
work, however, is not easily described since it has tittle precedent in the psychological 
literature, although it is not uncommon in the economic literature. Measurement or 
scaling theorists have generally been more concerned with producing marketable scales 
or tests than with verifying theories. The initial interest, for example, in Luce's choice 
theory stemmed from the (erroneous) belief that better scales could be produced for less, 
not because it was shown that the theory was true. One aspect of the problem posed by 
Marschak concerns the theoretical implications of various observable or testable con- 
straints on binary choice probabilities. The constraints considered include, for example, 
several probabilistie versions of transitivity. The theories are for the most part extremely 
weak statements relating scale values (or utilities) to choice probabilities. Of particular 
interest are the conditions that discriminate between well-known theories (e.g., Luce, 
Thurstone) and those that do not. Some knowledge of these results and the method of 
analysis would help clarify the current confusion between the ratios and differences of 
scale values and between power and logarithmic functions. 
The inclusion of Marschak's paper in the psychology section rather than in the 
economic section of this volume undoubtedly reflects some wishful thinking on the part 
of the editors. There appears to be no immediate danger of measurement theorists changing 
either their concern for reliability and validity or their veueration of scale values. For 
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this reason one looks with hope at another trend exhibited by these papers: the gradual 
infiltration of learning theorists into the measurement field. I t  is conceivable that  the 
learning theorists' concern for understanding behavior and their zeal for testing in detail 
the implications of their theories will influence the measurement field. The papers by 
Atkinson and Estes are two good examples of this infiltration. Included in Atkinson's 
theory of discrimination learning are parameters of stimulus similarity, and if the theory 
is correct these parameters can be used to define stimulus scale values. Questions of esti- 
mation of the parameters and goodness of fit of a variety of predictions can be answered 
(in principle) within the context of the theory. Estes' conceptualization of the choice 
process in terms of a random walk leads to, among other things, certain constraints on 
the choice probabilities, and for the binary case the constraints imply the existence of a 
Luce-t)Te scale. In  both papers, however, the existence of numbers associated with the 
stimuli is of less importance than understanding the behavior in question. 
Fortunately the careful development of the measurement area need not depend 
entirely on the by-products of learning theorists. There is still Luce's constant exploration 
of the measurement area from within. In  the present volume Luce's probing of the implica- 
tions of his choice axiom leads him to a more elementary breakdown of the choice process, 
somewhat different from the one developed by Estes. The result, for Luce, is a logarithmic 
relationship between latency and choice probability. I t  can be expected that  Luce will 
carry over these ideas into the learning field. 
As a final observation, it is interesting to compare the points of view of two papers 
juxtaposed in this volume. In  the first paper Estes indicates his uneasiness with theories 
that  have the organism maximizing utility by essentially postulating (i.e., putting int() the 
head of the organism) a maximizing faculty or propensity. His aim is to replace such 
complicated mechanisms by more elementary processes. In the following paper, Galanter 
and Miller's objection to the simple-minded view of the cortex implied in current theorizing 
leads them to develop a theory that  puts more complexity into the head of the organism. 
The question of how much to put  into or take out of the organism's brain is, of course, 
an old question and one that  will continue to be settled more by the actual accomplish- 
ments of competing theories and less by the interesting argumentations of competing 
theorists. 
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